RPX Blog

Patent Reform and the Law of Unintended Consequences

November 11, 2011

Recent commentary trumpeting the benefits of the America Invents Act look to be premature.  The overall trend is clear: no matter how you look at it, the NPE problem is getting worse.  2011 is already the biggest year ever for growth of NPE suits.

  • Total NPE suits year-to-date are up 71% and the number of unique defendants is up 26% from the same period last year.
  • There have already been 963 NPE cases filed as of October 31, 2011, impacting just over 2800 unique defendants versus 730 NPE cases filed in all of 2010 impacting just over 2900 unique defendants.
  • On average, each unique defendant this year is facing 10% more NPE cases than last year.
  • 186 NPE suits were filed in the immediate wake of patent reform, from September 16 – October 31, 2011, more than double from the same period last year (89 suits).


A good example of how the tea leaves are being misconstrued is the recent Dow Jones Newswire article “Patent Reform Seen Reducing Multi-Defendant Suits”.  While well written and carefully researched, the article cites recent statistics (some compiled with the assistance of RPX) to suggest that fewer companies are being sued because of the joinder provision of AIA, which limits when different defendants can be joined in the same suit.  While this has been true for the few weeks following passage of AIA, this is not indicative of a trend.

The joinder provision certainly will limit the number of defendants per suit.  That’s the law now, and we’re seeing its impact reflected in recent case filings (in the three months before AIA there was an average of five defendants per NPE suit; since patent reform that has dropped to two defendants per case).  But will the new provision necessarily translate into fewer defendants overall?  Very unlikely.  The NPE business model is built on asserting patents as broadly as possible.  If patent reform dictates fewer defendants per case, then we will probably just see more cases filed in general. Or plaintiffs will bring their claims to the International Trade Commission, where there is no limitation on defendants per case.  One thing history has taught is that NPEs will adapt.  The larger lesson we may all learn from patent reform is to beware the law of unintended consequences.

It appears, then, that the more things change in the patent litigation ecosystem, the more they stay the same.  AIA is clearly a well-intentioned effort to make needed change to that ecosystem, but it is still an open question whether those changes – or any legislated patent reform – can generate the kind of fundamental reduction of patent cost and risk that can be produced by market-driven efforts.

Tags: America Invents Act, Market-based Solution, NPE, NPE Litigation, NPE Patent Litigation, Patent Market, Patent Reform

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Is RPX an NPE?

November 2, 2010

Ask 12 people to describe a non-practicing entity and you are likely to get a dozen different definitions, ranging from the dismissively pejorative (“patent troll”) to the unabashedly admiring (“defender of intellectual property rights”).  Most observers have a firmly held opinion or an axe to grind, but from a neutral perspective, here’s a broad-based, fairly straightforward definition:
 
A company that acquires patents or patent rights and that generates revenue by monetizing those patents without manufacturing or using the patented invention(s). 
 
This is a definition that certainly describes Acacia Research, Guardian Media, Intellectual Ventures, and dozens of smaller-but-similar companies.  As it happens, it’s a definition that also describes RPX.  We buy patents, and as part of our revenue generating service, we grant licenses to those patents. 
 
If the definition is broadened a bit, however, RPX may not fit quite as readily into the NPE category.  The key consideration is how each of the companies in question extracts economic value from the patents they own.  When most people use the term “NPE”, they are referring to entities that monetize their assets through the legal system by suing or threatening litigation.  RPX also generates value from owned patents, but rather than directly monetizing our assets, we earn an annual fee for providing services to our clients.  Our primary service is identifying and removing the legal threats represented by patents for sale on the open market.  We also provide corollary client services such as IP market intelligence and strategic counsel.  This alone differentiates RPX.  If the definition of an NPE further specifies that revenue is generated by enforcing patent rights through litigation activity, then RPX is definitely not an NPE. 
 
These are, of course, fundamental distinctions.  RPX offers a market-based solution to avoiding patent risk, rather than a litigation-based approach. Our approach reflects the understanding by operating companies of a new and central truth: patents are in and of themselves economic assets.  The days of patents existing solely to legitimize a business activity are over.  Operating companies will continue to develop, buy, and sell legal patent rights to achieve exclusivity for selling products and services.  But a parallel commercial environment focused entirely on buying, selling, and licensing patents is growing larger every day.  We believe it is only a matter of time before this market – transparent, orderly, and grounded in commercial transactions, rather than legal disputes – will evolve and surpass today’s litigation-based valuation model.  When it happens, the definition of an NPE will be much broader and their activities, we believe, will be much less contentious.  More on that in a future post.

Tags: Monetizing Patent Assets, Non-practicing Entities, NPE, Patent Market, Patent Valuation, Selling Patents

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The Perils of "Invalid" Patents

April 8, 2010

Not all patents are created equal. While all issued patents carry the presumption of validity, the functional and legal legitimacy of most asserted patents is almost always called into question. When a patent is identified in an assertion letter, the first reaction of even the most experienced corporate IP counsel is usually to fight the alleged infringement and challenge the validity of the asserted patent in court.

But in almost all cases, it’s better to resist that temptation. A defendant might win the case, but the victory is likely to be a Pyrrhic one because the validity of a patent is rarely ascertained until well into the litigation process (and that process can grow even longer in those instances where the patent is thrown into re-examination before the USPTO). In even a relatively fast-moving case, it can easily take many months and cost hundreds of thousands of dollars in legal fees alone to prove that a patent and/or particular claim is invalid.

And even though a single patent assertion often has multiple named defendants, companies rarely choose to mount a joint defense, meaning the legal costs are borne by each defendant separately. Settling with the asserter – while distasteful, particularly if they are asserting a likely invalid patent – is usually the financially prudent course.

So the choice between settling and fighting an “invalid” patent in litigation is fairly straightforward. Once an assertion letter arrives, the cost/benefit argument in favor of settling is compelling. When a questionable, but potentially dangerous patent becomes available on the open market, however, the equation is slightly different. There is time for careful analysis of the asset’s legal viability when deciding whether to purchase or pass.

Even so, at RPX our strategy is generally to err on the side of financial caution. Validity is a highly subjective concept under patent law. Most problem patents aren’t strictly invalid in their own right – they are just being asserted in way that is broader than the valid coverage of their claims. But establishing where that line of “valid coverage” is crossed is rarely clear and never easy in court. So, even for patents of highly doubtful validity, the buy-or-pass decision usually boils down to either RPX paying the inventor/owner now or our members paying their attorneys later. And it is far more cost-effective to pay the (appropriately discounted) purchase price.

For example, RPX recently acquired a patent covering a device with a graphical user interface for retrieving digital media for playback. This patent could likely have been asserted by the prior owner against an incredibly broad set of products. The broader the assertion, the more likely the patent is to be invalidated, but also the greater potential cost and risk for our member companies. And the purchase price for the patent was reasonable in light of the potential aggregate costs of discovery and litigation. A credible legal case could be made that this patent would be considered invalid in many infringement scenarios. A stronger financial case can be made to take it out of circulation.

There are, of course, instances where an available patent asset is of dubious validity and not available at an appropriately, reasonably discounted price. Recently we considered purchasing a patent covering music identification via a mobile device. After a careful analysis of the potential litigation value vs. cost of the patent, we chose not to purchase the asset. The courts may yet endorse the validity of this patent, but thus far it has not been successfully asserted or generated meaningful settlements.

Ultimately our goal at RPX is to bring a rigorous, market-based economic rationale to the buying and selling of intellectual property. In the long-term this will mean valuing patents purely on their functional merits. In the near-term, all of us will need to treat “invalid” patents as legitimate and high-risk legal assets that warrant prudent and rational consideration.

Tags: Asserted Patents, Buying Patents, Intellectual Property, Invalid Patents, IP Industry, Patent Assertion Letters, Patent Validity, Patent Valuation, Selling Patents, USPTO

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